Innovate, Adapt & Win

- Brief Agenda

Briefer Name & Title


EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE 21
FORWARD and READY:
Now and in the Future

Current Situation

Updated April 10, 2015

~108,300 Operating Forces ~30,000 Deployed ~400 Iraq ~125 in Afghanistan

> *"We will continue to prioritize the support of those Marines in harm's way."*
> – Gen. J.F. Dunford


EUCOM: ~700
CENTCOM: ~5,000
SPMAGTF-CR-AF
NORTHCOM: ~800
SPMAGTF-CR-CC
USCENTCOM
USPACOM
31st MEU
USPACOM
SOUTHCOM: ~150
AFRICOM: ~1,300
24th MEU
PACOM (~22,000 WEST OF IDL)
CANADA
RUSSIA
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEXICO
C3F
C4F
C6F
C5F
C7F
FFC
INDIAN OCEAN
SOUTH PACIFIC

USMC

🔴 **OPERATIONS ~4,600**

🔵 **AMPHIB OPERATIONS ~4,500**

🟢 **EXERCISE/TSC ~1,000**

- Afghanistan (RCS) turnover Dec 2014
- 2014: 30 amphibious operations, 150 theater security cooperation events, and 130 exercises
- Marine Security Guard Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU) deployed 29 times during 2014
- Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) continued activities

~187,600 on Active Duty 182,000 FY16 Target End Strength

Expeditionary Force 21

Future Operating Environment



Intra-state Instability
- Under-governed spaces
- Demographic shifts

Urbanization and Conflict
- SE Asia, Africa, Americas

Land and Maritime Sovereignty Disputes
- Northeast Asia
- South China Sea

Global Interdependence
- Key littoral chokepoints
- Globalized markets

Regional Competition
- South China Sea
- Former Soviet Orbit

Identity Politics and Violent Power Struggles
- Africa and Middle East
- Urban artifact

HA/DR
- U.S. leadership in human disasters builds credibility and confidence

Water/Food Scarcity
- East Africa
- Middle East
- Asia

Piracy
- Continued source of financing terrorist/ criminal

Violent Extremism
- AQ 'franchise' or 'affiliate'
- Informed people not willing to suffer injustice

Transnational Crime
- Drug related violence and terrorism in Latin and South America

Defining The New Normal

CPG, CS21R & EF21
Force Development Drivers

U.S. MARINE CORPS
36th COMMANDANT'S PLANNING GUIDANCE
2015
INNOVATE
ADAPT
WIN


FORWARD ENGAGED READY
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
MARCH 2015


EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21
FORWARD and READY: Now and in the Future

- Naval Integration
- Maritime Domain: Integrating all domains into one
- All Domain Access: Operations in a Contested Environment
- Forward Presence and Assuring Regional Partners
- Building Partner Capacity
- Adaptive Force Packages with Alternative Platforms
- Naval/SOCOM Interoperability
- Naval TEEP: Schedule of Exercises
- Self-Deploying, High-Speed Vehicle and Future Connectors
- Digital Interoperability to the Squad
- Experiments with Disruptive Capabilities

Increasing Relevance of Naval Forces to GCCs and National Security

Commandant's Planning Guidance

- Naval Integration
- USMC/SOCOM Interoperability
- Building Partner Capacity Key
- Service/Naval TEEP
- Focus Experiments and Exercise on A2AD Threat
- Prioritize Self-Deploying, High-Speed Vehicle
- Alternative Platform CONOPS/SPMAGTF

U.S. MARINE CORPS
36th COMMANDANT'S PLANNING GUIDANCE
2015

INNOVATE
ADAPT
WIN

Intent: Set Conditions to Fight and Win Against Future Enemies ...and if Required win in an A2/AD environment



Where We Are Today

Major Combat Operations-Oriented Capability Development

produced a

Committed Expeditionary Force: OIF & OEF
w/ Limited Forward Presence and Crisis Response

to support a

Campaign-centric Operating Environment
Focused on Phase 3-4 Activities

accommodating smaller-scale actions / emphasizing enduring major operations

Steady-state Operations --------- **Crisis Response** --------- **CONPLAN / OPLAN Support**

phasizing sustained engagements and periodic interventions / servicing major op

Unstable/Uncertain Operating Environment
w/ Increased Emphasis on Phase 0-2

to support an

Crisis Response Force in Readiness: Forward-Postured

produces a

CMC's *Attributes of the Force*-oriented Capability Development

Where Expeditionary Force 21 Takes US

Expeditionary Force 21
Lines of Operation

Refining Our Organization

- MEB focus for capability developme
- Flexibility in MAGTF employment m
- Sustainability within austere enviro

Adjusting Our Forward Posture

- 1/3 operating forces forward
- Agility to respond across a wider area
- Operational reach and posture that enables crisis response

Increasing Naval Integration

- Integrating operational staffs
- Integrated concepts of operation
- Forward "compositing" at/near the crisis

Enhancing Littoral Maneuver

- Employ dispersed forces from greater dis
- Maneuverable throughout the littorals
- High-speed, long-range high-capacity system of connec

SPMAGTF
MEB (CE) Fly-in Echelon
MEU
Immediate Response Light MEB capacity within 3 to 7 days
① Aggregation & Immediate Response
Composite forward & rapidly deployable forces under a Scalable Fly-in Command Element (FICE)
Crisis Expands
Composited force is scalable & tailored to mission requirements
MPF (Sea-Based Enabled)
② Integration Seizing the Initiative
Force...Today
SPMAGTF
MEB CE
MEU
SPMAGTF
MEU
MEU
SPMAGTF Southeast Asia
OMF
High Speed Low Signature Maneuver

Goal is to improve how we support the requirements of Geographic Combatant Commanders

Crisis Response

- Events rarely evolve in exactly the way we expect…*poor predictive track record*
- Instability accompanies changes in the global order, threatens interests directly…and all Americans indirectly
- The Joint force plans for the things we can anticipate…*the enemy gets a vote*
- We will not get it entirely right, but we cannot afford to be entirely wrong
- The Marine Corps is the nation’s ability to intervene rapidly from the sea.. “most ready when the nation is least ready.”
- We buy time for situation development and strategic decision-making

Respond to Today’s Crisis…
with Today’s Force…
TODAY

Global Instability Spectrum



▲ = Key maritime chokepoint

IF you do not help us, we will be Killed
MAX SPEED 10 KPH



FY	CCMD ARG/MEU Requirement (Demand/Sourced (%))	CCMD Independent Amphibious Warship Requirement (Demand/Sourced (%))
2008	3.40/2.62 (77%)	3.50/1.88 (54%)
2009	3.40/2.28 (67%)	2.58/0.99 (38%)
2010	4.57/2.65 (58%)	3.89/1.47 (38%)
2011	4.60/3.10 (67%)	3.83/1.40 (37%)
2012*	4.44/2.29 (52%)	5.41/1.57 (29%)
2013**	4.60/2.35 (51%)	4.50/0.54 (12%)
2014***	5.60/2.14 (38%)	3.50/0.18 (5%)
2015***	4.90/2.36 (48%)	1.33/0.18 (14%)


UNCLASSIFIED
Capacity of Response
1 LMSR = 400 C-17s
1 LPD 17 = 64 C-17s
1 TAKE = 400 C-17s
Goal: 3.0ARG/MEU Forward w/ 2.0 ARG/MEU Surge
Gulf of Oman
E. Coast
8,221 nm
21.1 Days
W. Coast
10,321 nm
26.3 Days
Guam
5,888 nm
14.8 Days
Sea of Japan
E. Coast
13,400 nm
32.8 Days
W. Coast
5,600 nm
13.6 Days
Guam
1,837 nm
4.5 Days
11 Days
11 Days
11 Days
East Coast Amphibs
West Coast Amphibs
11 Days
5 Days
5 Days
5 Days
1
2
3
4
5
MEU
MEU
MEU
Guam
1,408 nm
3.4 Days
5,013 nm
12.8 Days
7,358 nm
18 Days
6,801 nm
14.2 Days

Expeditionary Roots…Forward and Ready


MEF
MEB CE
Rapidly Deployable
MEF
MEB CE
SPMAGTF
MEU
SPMAGTF
MEU
SPMAGTF
SPMAGTF Southeast Asia
MEF
MEB CE
MEU

Strategically located assets--distributed capabilities where it makes sense

OMFTS & STOM Remain Valid

Amphibious Operations in a Contested Environment

We are using a modified "toolbox" & CONOPS


DDG 1000
Fire Support Area
Fire Support Area
Outer Sea Echelon Area
Assault Support & Connector Launch & Recovery
ACV Launch Area
Assault Lane
ACV Launch Area
Assault Lane
Littoral Penetration Points
Primary & Alternate Penetration Routes
•Night ACV launch from LPD 17 to mitigate threat;
•ACVs maneuver ashore through distributed penetration points;
Fire Support Area
50nm
40nm
30nm
20nm
10nm
0nm
1000 nm
Low Signature Maneuver
High Speed
OBJ A
LPS
OBJ B
LPS

65+ NM
Power projection to raid and defeat A2AD; conduct NEO, respond to crisis or open penetration points

50-30 NM
Threat mitigated; JFMCC can protect Sea Echelon Area for air and surface connector, boat, ACV operations/launch

25-12 NM
CDCM defeated, w/ escort amphibs can close to 12nm for ACV launch

Surface: LCACs / SSCs transport amphibious vehicle to penetration points; Vertical: MV-22s & CH-53s to inland objectives

- **Littoral Maneuver we use the sea to our advantage and project power from greater range with reduced exposed signature. A feasible *littoral maneuver CONOPS* exists today and with a system of air/surface maneuver capabilities**


SEAPOWER IN ACTION:
Sea Control & Power Projection
F-35B
Offensive Air Support
Disaggregated
Company Sized
Landing Teams
ARG / MEU
Littoral Penetration Sites
Beaches of Opportunity
ARG / MEU
1 SEIZE
ADVANCED BASE
3 INTEGRATE
HEADQUARTERS AFLOAT
2 COMPOSITE CRISIS
RESPONSE FORCE
Afloat
Staging Base
Fly-In Naval
Command Element
Prepositioned
Shipping
Carrier Strike
Group
SPMAGTF
Aboard Amphibious Ship

Expeditionary Force 21 in Action: Compositing Naval Forces…Agility in Responding to Crisis and Assuring Littoral Access

Employment Realities

South Sudan/Libyan NEO

Navy SEAL Raid Somalia

AFRICA
1343 miles-Moron, SP to Tripoli
343 miles-Sigonella to Tripoli
3004 miles-Moron, SP to Juba, S Sudan
ASIA
Baraawe, Somalia – Navy SEAL Team Six attempts to capture an al-Shabaab leader, but are driven back
Mogadishu, Somalia
Nairobi, Kenya
Anbar Province
SAUDI ARABIA

Iraq's Sinjar Mountain

Emerging Scenario: Seize Al Anbar

Small unit leader must be exceptionally qualified to make split second decisions in very complex environments

- Pace of change
- Battlefield complexity
- Population increase
- ISR/weapons Proliferation
- Reduced access w/ less lift
- Media savvy enemies
- Urbanization of littorals

Places a premium on...

- Small unit leader's ability
- Smaller, faster, longer range formations
- Amphibious ships
- MSC vessels
- Strategic airlift

AFSB SPMAGTF Concept of Employment

AFSB (MLP-3) Current Program Schedule (Pre-Decisional)

- Jul 2015: Delivery
- Jul-Sep 2015: Post Delivery Availability (PSA), San Diego
- Sep - Nov 2015: Transit to Norfolk
- Nov 2015-Sep 2016: Post Delivery Test & Trials (PDT&T), Norfolk
- Sep - Dec 2016: Post Shakedown Availability (PSA), Norfolk
- Dec 2016: MLP AFSB ready for tasking
- Dec 2016-Jan 2017: Transit to AOR

AFSB (MLP-3) Proposed Program Schedule with USMC Event Inserts

- **Present – Jul 2015: USMC COE/CONOPS Development/Wargaming, NCR**
- Jul 2015: Delivery
- Jul-Sep 2015: Post Delivery Availability (PSA), San Diego
  - **SPMAGTF ashore TTX, San Diego**
- Sep - Nov 2015: Transit to Norfolk
  - **SPMAGTF onboard TTX, Norfolk**
- Nov 2015-Sep 2016: Post Delivery Test & Trials (PDT&T), Norfolk
  - **SPMAGTF tests, demos, experiments vic Norfolk**
- Sep - Dec 2016: Post Shakedown Availability (PSA), Norfolk
- Dec 2016: MLP AFSB ready for tasking
  - **SPMAGTF at-sea exercise**


Sahara
Mauritania
Nouakchott
نواكشوط
Mali
Niger
Chad
Dakar
Senegal
The Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Bamako
Burkina Faso
Niamey
Conakry
Guinea
Benin
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Togo
Côte d'Ivoire
Ghana
Lagos
Liberia
Lome
Abidjan
Gulf of Guinea
Cameroon
Yaounde
Central African Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Congo
Brazzaville
DR Congo
Luanda
Angola

MV-22B
Radius, 600nm
with (1) refueling
(RTB bingo fuel)

MV-22B
Radius, 325nm
unrefueled

UH-1Y/
AH-1Z
Combat Radius
119/131nm

RQ-21
Radius 50nm

SEABASE
12nm off-shore

Legend
RQ-21 range
UH range
MV 22 range un refueled
MV 22 range with one refuel

Digital Interoperability (DI)

Ground Board, Fall 2014:

- Expeditionary Force 21 increased priority for Enhanced C2/DI from company down to squad level
- Immediate and long-term approaches
- Six layers: 1) BLOS reachback; 2) Aerial Relay; 3) In-transit C2; 4) Aviation Integration; 5) Internal C2; and 6) Naval Integration
- Over reliance on satellite communications increases risk to the GCE

2015 Marine Aviation Plan:

- Digital Interoperability is the seamless digital exchange of tactically relevant information between the different elements of the MAGTF, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the force as a whole
- Every platform a sensor, every platform an EW node, every platform a shooter, and every platform a connector, are our goals



Integrated and Interoperable Command & Control

- Ensure connectivity and interoperability of a composited naval force
- MAGTF solutions must be interoperable across MAGTF, Naval, Joint Force and coalition
- Operate in a technology degraded environment
  - What if we can’t access satellites?
- Provide situational awareness to the squad level

Provide the connectivity and interoperability for follow on forces and agencies

Operate to Know (OTK)

“Out-adapt” enemy’s OODA loop

- An operating concept that generates higher tempo and more effective operations by exploiting sensing and analysis capabilities and, when required, placing energy into the enemy’s environment to create a real-time picture of the enemy response
- The United States has a surplus capacity to destroy with precision, but an insufficient capacity to know and to find with precision
- Key aspects of OTK are derivative of existing best practices employed in combat now
- Limiting reliance on tactics such as the movement to contact may lessen asymmetric advantages and produce more enduring results
- By placing a premium on sensing and knowing, OtK affords the opportunity to “out-adapt” our adversaries



Expeditionary Advance Bases

- Rapid establishment, displacement or disestablishment provides greater maneuver and proximity to adversary for more strike options
- Facilitates employment of friendly A2/AD dome…land-based missile systems (long range anti-ship, anti-air and counter-missile fires)
- Expands network of maritime “sensors , shooters and sustainment” for sea control
- Critical to the sustainment and success of distributed fleet: logistics hub; fast missile boat basing, C2 support, counter mine operations, ship maintenance, repair and rearm
- Contributes to dispersion thus survivability of the force
- Expands access in a contested environment.
- Provides critical sustainment items in large bulk
- Can construct M-FARP Decoys
- Facilitates RSO&I at ISB
- Supports in-stream offload and alt platform operations

Island Chain Advance Base
Sea Control & Power Projection

Distributed STOVL Ops

- Maximize the employment of KC-130J and MV22 in long range maneuver
- Increase certification of USMC A/C aboard all platforms
- Develop a CONOPS and capabilities for Distributed STOVL
- Integrate airborne ISR, C2, STOVL and tactical maneuver capabilities
- Exploit aviation to rapidly maneuver to or control landing areas for amphibious operations

Exploit the asymmetric advantages provided by the MAGTF’s Aviation Element—reach—combat power—C2

Ground Combat Element Vision

"Required GCE Characteristics"

- Squad Leader Development Program (SLDP)
- Rifle platoon: base element for maneuver
- Operate primarily dismounted supported by platforms
- Building block is the rifle squad (648 in 24 Bn)
- Squad must have exceptionally qualified leaders
- Increase GT from 80 to 105
- Increase physical standards
- Increase certification requirements (Marksmanship, Joint Fires)
- Digitally interoperable with rest of MAGTF

Employ three company sized elements from different commands (e.g. SPMAGTF –CR-AF/CC & MEU) without stopping at an ISB, and do it at night in a very complex situation

Ground Combat Element Vision

“Risk and Opportunity”

- Historical innovation momentum
- Greatest risk may be not embracing opportunities to “innovate and adapt”

1) Focus on our infantry soul, expeditionary, primarily dismounted, and forward, from the sea

2) Raising the capabilities of the GCE Marine

3) Employing three reinforced rifle companies in a dispersed, distributed, and/or disaggregated manner while retaining the capability to fight concentrated

4) Sufficient lift to provide armored protection for one reinforced division-sized element operating in urban littoral environments

5) Employing scalable, deployable, employable, and sustainable expeditionary forces that can rapidly concentrate from a

Accepting higher degrees of risk is matter of priority and trust

1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020

Amphibious Demand and Readiness

Adm. Samuel Locklear
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, March, 2014

"I'm not the only combatant commander that desires amphibious shipping or the Marines that are on them. So there is a global competition among us as the world situation kind of moves around. [And] the global demand signal today is … greater than what we can



FY	CCMD ARG/MEU Requirement (Demand/Sourced (%))	CCMD Independent Amphibious Warship Requirement (Demand/Sourced (%))
2008	3.40/2.62 (77%)	3.50/1.88 (54%)
2009	3.40/2.28 (67%)	2.58/0.99 (38%)
2010	4.57/2.65 (58%)	3.89/1.47 (38%)
2011	4.60/3.10 (67%)	3.83/1.40 (37%)
2012*	4.44/2.29 (52%)	5.41/1.57 (29%)
2013**	4.60/2.35 (51%)	4.50/0.54 (12%)
2014***	5.60/2.14 (38%)	3.50/0.18 (5%)
2015***	4.90/2.36 (48%)	1.33/0.18 (14%)



SHIP	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
LHD-1	8	8	8	8	8	8
LHA-1	1	1	0	0	0	0
LHA-6	1	1	1	1	2	2
LPD-17	9	9	10	11	11	11
LSD-41	8	8	8	8	8	8
LSD-49	4	4	4	4	4	4
TOTAL	31	31	31	32	33	33

* Inventory at end of FY

Amphib Readiness Challenges Persist:
Extended availabilities, emergent repairs, compressed training, ship substitutions, extended deployments

Integrating air and surface capabilities, innovating with alternative platforms and developing surface connectors



LPD-17
Capable of basing over 700 Marines, their equipment and supplies and projecting capabilities ashore with LCACs, conventional landing craft, amphibious connectors and rotary lift craft.

LHA-8
Lifts and supports over 1300 Marines and the MAGTF command & control nodes- is main base to fixed (JSF), rotary wing / tilt rotor, and unmanned aircraft systems. Well deck supports simultaneous landing craft operations. Level II medical capability.

LSD
Provides largest capacity to operate landing craft in support of MAGTF operations.

LMSR
Military Sealift Command's (MSC) Large, Medium Speed, Roll-On/ Roll-Off ship (LMSR) program significantly expands the nation's sealift capability as a prime mover of US military equipment. The ships carry vehicles and equipment to support humanitarian missions, as well as combat missions.

JHSV
Provides high speed transportation for over 300 Marines and 20,000 sq ft of MAGTF equipment.

Ship to Shore Connector (SSC)
Provides modernized landing craft over-the-beach capability.

Mobile Landing Platform
Leverages float-on/ float-off technology and has raised vehicle platform, sideport ramp, mooring fenders and LCAC lanes. Utility of "Interoperable Pier in the Ocean" spans the Range of Military Operations.

In future crises, forward based and forward deployed amphibious and MPF forces will continue to demonstrate their inherent flexibility and utility by aggregating with surged forces to conduct engagement, crisis response or forcible entry operations.

T-AKE
Offers selective access and off load of unitized supplies for prepositioning MEB and other MAGTFs operating in the sea base or ashore.

Work to be Done

- Clear Articulation of How We Fight w/ a GCE Vision
- Littoral operations
  - Produce Naval littoral operations concept
    - UK / US CONOPS Contested Littoral Operations / Similar Naval Board Task
    - CMC EOS TTX series
    - Boat Operations / Riverine prospectus and CONOPS
    - Compositing CONOPS
  - Develop a prospectus for a expeditionary advance base concept;
  - Artic warfare concept
  - Under Joint Staff cognizance, develop scenarios for analytic study
  - MOC manning: CONOPS for an expeditionary ops cell
- C2 interoperability
  - Amphibious C2 enhancing shipboard C2 prospectus (amphib & alt platforms)
  - Aviation C2 future CONOPS

- Urban Ops
  - How we fight
  - Suppressed weapons
  - Connector assessments and the exploration of the possible
  - Future assessment for moving forces ashore
- Expeditionary Logistics
  - All environments for all organizations
- Operate to Know: raising the adversary signature
  - Unmanned Systems: breacher; beach reconnaissance; Urban R&S
- Military Deception
  - Employ obscurants/camouflage
  - Reducing signature: suppressed weapons; Suppressed vehicles
  - Decoy employment
- Tech denied/ impaired environment

In Summary…The Challenges

- Operating in an increasingly lethal and complex world
- Developing leaders that understand commander’s intent and thrive in uncertainty
- Operating in urban and complex terrain
- Integrating forward stationed and deployed naval forces
- Integrating air and surface capabilities at the Seabase
- Conducting fully integrated amphibious operations above the ARG/MEU level
- Developing surface connectors with greater speed, range and capacity
- Developing integrated naval, joint and coalition C2 systems
- Synchronizing naval wargames, table tops and exercises

“AMPHIBIOUS FLEXIBILITY IS THE GREATEST STRATEGIC ASSET THAT A SEA-BASED POWER POSSESSES.”

- B.H. LIDDELL HART, DETERRENCE OR DEFENSE, 1960

QUESTIONS


EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21
FORWARD and READY: Now and in the Future

Expeditionary Force 21 Website: http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/EF21.aspx

BACKUPS

Major Rocks in the Rucksack

- Institutionalizing Expeditionary Force 21
- Developing an Executable Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy
- Developing and Resourcing Amphibious Shipping and Connectors Strategy
- Developing a Naval TEEP (USMC and Navy)
- Training and Educating the Force

UNCLASSIFIED

Contribution of the Corps

For 7.8% of the FY14 DoD Budget, the Marine Corps provides:

General Officers



Senior Executive Service



15% of Active Ground Maneuver Battalions
11% of Fighter / Attack Aircraft
16% of Artillery Battalions
19% of attack helicopters

FY13 Recruiting Goals (% of Service Enlisted Total)
USMC: 37,314 (19.1%)
ARMY: 69,000 (12.6%)
NAVY: 38,200 (12.2%)
AIR FORCE: 28,532 (8.7%)

Force Characteristics

"More operational, youngest, and most junior"

	Operating Forces	Average Age	E-3 and Below
USMC	118,436 (61%)	26	82,822 (42.3%)
ARMY	319,000 (58%)	29	103,671 (19.5%)
NAVY	162,021 (50%)	28.8	71,762 (22.1%)
AIR FORCE	155,194 (46%)	29.5	62,628 (19.0%)



Civilian to Active Duty Ratio
USMC 1:9.8
ARMY 1:2.2
NAVY 1:1.8
AIRFORCE 1:2.2

USMC: Lowest Officer to Enlisted Ratio

Active Duty Officer / Enlisted Ratio
USMC 1:8.2
ARMY 1:4.3
NAVY 1:4.9
AIR FORCE 1:4.0

USMC: Lowest Civilian to Active Ratio

Average Cost per Active Duty Personnel

Marine	$70,869
Soldier	$81,078
Sailor	$85,984
Airman	$91,274

USMC: Lowest Cost

UNCLASSIFIED

MULTI-DOMAIN CAPABLE ACROSS ROMO



- *Crisis Response Force*
- *High State of Readiness*
- *Expeditionary Nature*
- *Scalable & Task Organized*
- *Amphibious*
- *Any Clime and Place*

On a single day...15th MEU conducting HA/DR in Pakistan; Harrier combat missions in Afghanistan; Taking down pirates on the *MV Magellan Star*.

Commandant's Planning Guidance

Who We Are

- Every Marine a Rifleman
- Disciplined, Smart, Physical, Ethical
- High Standards/Institutional Integrity
- Expeditionary Naval Mindset
- Elitism/Cohesiveness, Same Experiences

U.S. MARINE CORPS
36th COMMANDANT'S PLANNING GUIDANCE
2015
INNOVATE
ADAPT
WIN

What We Do

- Make Warfighting Marines
- Crisis Response Fwd Deployed Fwd Engag
- Mission Tactics: Common Understanding
- Combined Arms, Maneruverist, Asymmetr
- Operate in a Decentralized Manner
- Ready to Fight Anywhere Tonight
- Innovate with What We Have
- Evolve CONOPS, Adaptable, Scalable, Take Risk

Commandant's Planning Guidance

Where We Are Headed

- Naval Integration
- USMC/SOCOM Interoperability
- Building Partner Capacity Key
- GCC Marine Component
- Service-level TEEP
- Training aligned with T&R standards
- Exercise A2AD Threat
- Focus Experiments on Disruptive Capabil
- MAGTF Cyber Capabilities for Warfighting
- Prioritize Self-Deploying, High-Speed Veh
- Alternative Platform CONOPS/SPMAGTF
- Digital Interoperability

USNORTHCOM
USEUCOM
USCENTCOM
USAFRICOM
USPACOM
USSOUTHCOM
00:01:59
00:05:03
01:00:09
DATA CONNECT
SNIFFER RUNNING

Set Conditions to Fight and Win Against Future Enemies

CMC FY17 POM Priorities

- Distributed Operations to the Company Level
- Over the Horizon Capabilities
- Ground Ordinance – Rockets and Missiles
- Equipment Density List for SPMAGTF
- Supporting Establishment Support to Above

Concept Based Requirements

Marine Corps Concepts such as...

- ✓ Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)
- ✓ Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)
- ✓ Seabasing

...are now being executed

So What's Next?...

Expeditionary Force 21

- ✓ Refocus on our expeditionary culture
- ✓ Prepared for Today's Crisis, with Today's Force, Today!
- ✓ "Prepared to do the same with less"

Expeditionary Force 21 Attributes

Expeditionary Force In "Readiness"
Forward Deployed Crisis Response

Naval Force
Sea as Maneuver Space/ Naval Integration
Disaggregated Operations/Regional SA

Middleweight Force
Expeditionary by Design
Scalable and Tailorable

Forcible Entry in Depth
Aggregates Amphibious Ships and MPF
Accepts increased MCO Risk

Leading Edge of Joint Force
JTF-Enabled Standing MEB CEs

Integrated Combined Arms Force
Trained as a Fully Integrated Force

Modern Force
Leverages Technology and ISR
Alternative Naval Platforms

Force Biased for Action
Prioritizes GCC Crisis Response Support
New Normal; Fight and Win Tonight

North Korea
P'yongyang
Sea of Japan (East Sea)
South Korea
Japan
MEB
WHITE 1
MARFORNORTH
MARFORSOUTH
I MEF
1st MEB CE
MARFORPAC
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Major Combat Operations
HA / DR Pakistan
OMAN
YEMEN
15 MEU
Counter-Piracy Operations
OCEAN

Right Force, Right Place, At The Right Time

UNCLASSIFIED

What We Know

- ***The Marine Corps is optimized to be expeditionary…***
  - **Ready, *fast, austere, and lethal!***
  - **Purpose built for austere environments**
  - **Thrives in chaos and adversity**
  - **Competent and lethal**

Our expeditionary nature and the ability to project power is a defining characteristic and a national asset

What We Believe

- We must operate from a forward deployed stance
- We create access, deter enemies, prevent crisis, respond when needed, and force entry
- We will fearlessly adapt to maintain the ability to project sustainable combat power or influence.
- We must provide employment options for the geographic commander

The Nation demands crisis-response forces to meet the growing threat to our national interests

Expeditionary Force 21 Implementation Objectives

Maneuver: Naval Integration: Distribute MAGTF resources across a wider range of naval platforms to operate more effectively in the maritime domain.

Littoral Operations: Develop platforms (surface connectors, ships, boats) that allow MAGTF elements to project ashore from multiple naval platforms.

Logistics: Enhanced ability to link deployed units into forward logistics hubs (MPSRON/CLF/SOF/HN/IA). Maximize unit self-sustaining capabilities.

Intel/C2: Ensure connectivity and interoperability of a composited naval force, TSOCs. Develop a means to integrate with Joint, IA and Coalition partners connectivity and operability.

Fires / Force Protection: Fire support enhancements are required to provide responsive, all-weather fire support options to forces maneuvering from the sea and in support of dispersed formations.

Develop solutions that enhance our ability to deploy (move) and employ (use) as scalable units, across a broader range of platforms within the austere operating environment.

Expeditionary Force 21

…Driving Solutions to Gaps

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21
FORWARD and READY:
Now and in the Future

	Enhance Mobility (ACV, ITV Smaller Cheaper, Exoskeleton)
	ACV 2.0 & Next Gen Connector (Splash from Connector~20nm speed)
	**Operating from More Platforms** (Increase Availability, Modify Platforms, fit FIE on MSC)
	Increase lethality-Leverage Fires (HIMARS, BMD Ashore & Enhanced Munitions)
	Austere/Distributed Sustainment (E2O, Reduce Lift & Footprint, Lighten the Load)
	Composited Combined-Naval C2 (Interoperabiliy, Cyber/EW, Tech Denied Capability)
	Better Integrate Navy Functions (NECC, Beach Master, Landing Support, Riverine)
	Distributed STOVL/Max Aviation

…and Exercise, Exercise, Exercise…

ENDS – WAYS – MEANs

Operating Environment

- Global Challenges/New Norm
- Increased Crisis Response Events
- Fiscal Restraint
- Joint/Coalition Integration

- OPLAN/CONPLAN Requirements remain valid
- International Political Considerations
- Potential Limited Access to Friendly Land Bases

END

Provide Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) with task-organized Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) capable of rapidly responding to crises and contingencies within a joint and/or coalition framework

WAYS

Rapidly composite a combination of forward deployed, forward based, and CONUS-based units under a scalable and rapidly deployable MEB Command Element

MEANS

- MEUs/SPMAGTFs
- Rapidly Deployable Forces (Amphibs, Alert Contingency MAGTFs, Fwd-Based Forces)
- Organic Intra-Theater Lift (KC-130, MV-22)
- Strategic/Inter-Theater Lift (Air/Sea)
- Joint/Forward Staging Capability (incl. MPS)

Scalable Naval C2 Structure
- ➢Fly-in Expeditionary MEB C2 Capability
- ➢Naval in Character
- ➢Joint-Capable
- ➢Ability to integrate with JTF or CJTF

Global Commons Challenge:
Littorals, Chokepoints & Sea Lines

National security achieved in the littoral regions…where sea control and littoral power projection meet the human domain ashore.



Adaptive Adversary

Employing Combined Arms in the Littorals

- 75% of people live w/in 200mi of a coast
- 70% of world is water
- 95% of international communications
- 30,000 ships are underway daily carrying 93% of the world's international commerce
- 49% of the world's oil travels through the major chokepoints

Complex Littoral Terrain

Rocky Coastline

Urban Canyon

Poor
Infrastructure

Islets, Reefs, Shoals

Urban Slum

Estuaries & Coastal Mud Flats

Mobility strategy must account for a range of missions and

Generalized Global Cross Country Mobility (CCM)

Global Summary Maps for Six Vehicle Classes

🟥R Very Restricted
🟥R-R Very Restricted to Restricted
🟧 Restricted
🟨-NR Restricted to Not Restricted
🟩R Not Restricted


Light Combat


Light Tactical


Medium Combat


Medium Tactical


Heavy Combat


Heavy Tactical

Mobility and Terrain Diversity



Mobility strategy must account for a range of missions and threat environments.

Littoral Maneuver Threat Assessment

- Drone proliferation have changed standoff requirements.
- Crisis response is come as you are w/limited ability to conduct shaping.
- Complications of anti-ship missile defense place demands on the escorts required to protect the amphibious force
- The ability to close amphibious ships to 1-2 nm or even 12 nm in an area denial environment requires defeat of anti-ship missiles and escort to defeat leakers.

an A2AD environment but we need to:
closure and condition setting
aggregate and composite required capabilities
mpact of time and risk
an missiles
y increases as we close

sault:
es can be mitigated
“warm start” (SOF, ISR, NEF, etc.)
will involve limited shaping,
ems and take out key parts



300 nm + ASBM; Sky Wave Radar

165 nm ASCM; Early Warning Radar

65nm C802

25 nm Coastal Radar

<10.8 nm ASCM; AAA, Air Def; Mines; Small Boat; GRAMM

How does this effect how we fight?

Evolution of the Anti-Ship Cruise Missile…



Line-of-sight 25km

Active Radar Sea-skimming 120km

Multiple Waypoints Fire and Forget In-flight Updates

Smaller Missile Larger Warhead 230km

Supersonic Lo-Hi-Lo Profile 280km

Enemy Capabilities

Friendly Conditions



ASCM/ASBM
Hyper/Supersonic Missiles
Sortied Naval Surface Force
Aircraft (FW)
Subs
Integrated Air Defense (IAD)
Theater/Tactical Ballistic Missiles

Super/Sub sonic Missiles
UAS (Group 4)
Mines (hydrography dependent)

G-RAMM
Large Caliber Tube Artillery
Aircraft (Rotary Wing)
UAS (Group 3)
FAC/FIAC
MLRS

Medium Caliber Tube Artillery
UAS (Group 2)
Midget Subs

Light Caliber Tube Artillery
Large Mortars
UAS (Group 1 and Micro)

Physical Obstacles IVO Beach
Direct Fire Weapons

C4ISR Infrastructure Defeated/Disabled
ASCM/ASBM Neutralized
Local Maritime Superiority; SLOCs Open
IAD Neutralization
Protected Air/Surface Maneuver Corridors
Local Sub Threat Defeated
IO/IW/Cyber in Scheme of Maneuver
Theater and Tactical BMD in Place

ASCM/CDCM Defeated
IAD Neutralized
Naval Forces Neutralized
Sea Echelon Area Established

IAD Defeated
Air Corridor / Axis of Advance Established
Naval Corridor/Assault Lanes Established
FAC/FIAC Defeated
Amphibious Ships Protected
Landing Craft Protected

Amphibious Vehicle Protected
Landing Site Overwatch/Security Established

In Stride Breaching capability
Lodgment Established
JLOTs or Pier-side activities

Power Projection



- Maneuver throughout the littoral
- Across the range of military operations
- Thrive in uncertain environments where access is not guaranteed

- Creates opportunity & options
- Enhances surprise
- Extends reach
- Enables multiple entry points
- Enables littoral maneuver



Deployment In Relation To Threat Range

- Allows seabase to position over the horizon…enhances survivability of ships
- Range & speed provides standoff from anti-access threats
- Outside threat of rockets, artillery, mortars , small boat, mitigates

Amphibious Operations Often Confused With Amphibious Assault

- ***Amphibious assault***…the establishment of a landing force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
- ***Amphibious raid***…a swift incursion into or a temporary occupation of an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal.
- ***Amphibious demonstration***…*a show of force conducted to deceive* with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him.
- ***Amphibious withdrawal***…the extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
- ***Amphibious support to other operations.*** A type of amphibious operation which contributes to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation…such as security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil support, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, recovery operations, or disaster relief, etc.

Amphibious operations may take place in *permissive*, *uncertain*, or *hostile* environments.

Enhance Littoral Maneuver

- Rapidly field an Amphibious Combat Vehicle
- Develop and improve the capabilities of connectors
- Develop vehicles, boats, and landing craft with endurance and speed to operate from greater ranges
- Develop the means to integrate grey and black bottom shipping
- Develop more capable internally transportable capabilities to supp

Family of systems that provide transformational capabilities

From the Sea Since 1990

116 Amphibious Operations

Since 1990 conducting over 137 missions across ROMO

ide needs to be
updated using
ord doc “Amphib
ps 1990-2013”



34	🟩	HA/DR
13	🟪	Peace Operations/Nation Assist
40	🟦	Other (No Fly/Show of Force, Ect)
20	🟧	NEO/Embassy Spt
22	🟥	Asslt, Raid, Strike & Demo
8	🟫	CT/COIN
137		Missions

Means to do this:
Amphibious Ships





Year	Significant Operations
1990	**Liberia: American Embassy Evacuation**
1991	**Persian Gulf: Desert Storm**
1992	**Tunisia: Firefighting**
1993	**Somalia: Humanitarian Operations**
1994	**Rwanda & Uganda : (HA/DR)**
1995	**Bosnia: Scott O’Grady Rescue**
1996	**Central African Rep: Embassy Evacuation**
1997	Sierra Leone: Embassy Evacuation
1998	Kuwait: No Fly Zone
1999	East Timor: Peacekeeping
2000	Yugoslavia : Air Strikes
2001	Afghanistan: Amphibious Assault
2002	Kosovo : Peacekeeping
2003	Iraq: Amphibious Assault
2004	Southeast Asia: Tsunami (HA/DR)
2005	Gulf Coast: Hurricane Katrina Relief
2006	Lebanon: American Citizen Evacuation
2007	Horn of Africa: Security Cooperation
2008	Burma: Typhoon (HA/DR)
2009	Indonesia: Earthquake (HR/DR)
2010	Haiti and Pakistan: Earthquake and flood (HR/DR)
2011	Japan and Libya: Earthquake and No Fly/TRAP

Navy Marine Corps Alignment

CNO's
Navigation Plan
2015 - 2019

Where it Matters When it Matters

Warfighting First

Be ready to fight and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow

Operate Forward

Provide offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty

Be Ready

Harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force to be ready to fight and responsibly employ our resources

CS21

Naval Board

Naval TEEP

ESG/MEB

MOC

JFMCC

Wargames

Exercises

CMC Message to Marines


EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21
FORWARD and READY:
Now and in the Future

Right Force Right Place Right Time

Prioritize Marines in Harm's Way

Maintain well-trained well-equipped Marines in a high state of readiness

Forward Deployed Forward Engaged Crisis Response

Forward-deployed posture to meet crisis response requirements

Expeditionary Force-in-Readiness

Developing and fielding innovative, relevant, naval, expeditionary force-in-readiness capabilities

Increasing Relevance of Naval Forces to GCCs and National Security

Expeditionary Force 21

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

CONOPS

- Rapidly deployable and JTF-capable CE with task-organized air-ground forces that are composited from forward-deployed and/or rapidly deployable forces in order to fulfill GCC operational requirements.
- Regionally orient MEBs to meet prioritized Combatant Commanders' operational requirements



Expeditionary Roots...Forward and Ready

Strategically located assets--distributed capabilities where it makes sense

20

Hours-5 Days	**6-7 Days**	**25 Days**
CJTF Capable General Officer-led fly-in Command Element (CE) that builds on forward-deployed SPMAGTF, ARG/MEU, etc.	CJTF Capable General Officer-led CE that builds on forward-deployed SPMAGTF, ARG/MEU, etc.; augmented as necessary by additional rapidly deploying Marines, Joint or coalition forces	CJTF Capable General Officer-led CE that builds on forward-deployed SPMAGTF, MEU, and other forward-deployed joint and coalition forces. Likely includes regimental/group sized units

Compositing and Integrating the MAGTF



SP MAGTF
CVBG
MEB CE
ME
U
Joint
TSOC

Alert Contingency MAGTF
CVBG
MEB CE
MPS
Joint
Coalition

MEB CE
MEB
CVBG
Joint
Coalition

Globally Networked Forward Presence

Joint Seabasing

Rapid Build of Capabilities

6 Hours-5 Days

6-7 Days

25 Days

CJTF Capable General Officer-led fly-in Command Element (CE) that builds on forward-deployed SPMAGTF, ARG/MEU, etc.

CJTF Capable General Officer-led CE that builds on forward-deployed SPMAGTF, ARG/MEU, etc.; augmented as necessary by additional rapidly deploying Marines, Joint or coalition forces

CJTF Capable General Officer-led CE that builds on forward-deployed SPMAGTF, MEU, and other forward-deployed joint and coalition forces. Likely includes regimental/group sized units

Integrating Seabasing Capability

Deployment, assembly, command, projection, sustainment, reconstitution and reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area …



ANNUAL REPORT FOR PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM 2017

SEABASING

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Combat Development & Integration

Now Online



…while using the sea as maneuver space and generating global force power projection

Integrating Seabasing Capability




T-AKE
LHA-8
LSD
LPD-17
TAK
LMSR
MLP
JHSV

SSC
craft FY20
2 craft *FY29

SC (X)-R
IOC: 6 craft FY22
FOC: 32 craft FY26

Future Capabilities

"We will aggressively develop concepts of employment for alternative platforms that are consistent with mission requirements and platform capabilities." – CPG 2015

Investment in Next Generation of Future Connectors

Seabasing Related Capability Gaps



Surface Assault During Amphibious Maneuver

Ship to Shore Connectors

Amphibious Force Sufficiency and Strategic Lift

C2 Aboard Non-Traditional Naval Platforms

AAV At-Sea Recovery

Engage Direct Fire Targets During Amphibious Operations

Conduct MPF Operations

Spatial & Situational Awareness During Amphibious Operations

NSFS for MAGTF Operations

Clear Assault Lanes / Craft Landing Zones During Amphibious Operations

Seabasing Force Preparation

Amphibious Capabilities

AIRFIELD / PORT SEIZURE

AMPHIBIOUS ASSSAULT

AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION

AMPHIBIOUS RAID

AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

COUNTERPROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

DISASTER RELIEF

EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING, COORDINATION, CONTROL IN A JOINT/COMBINED ENVIRONMENT

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

IN-EXTREMIS HOSTAGE RECOVERY

INITIAL TERMINAL GUIDANCE

JOINT/COMBINED INSTRUCTION TEAM

JOINT TASK FORCE ENABLING OPERATIONS

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

PEACEKEEPING

PEACE OPERATIONS

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

SECURITY OPERATIONS

SEIZURE / RECOVERY OF OFFSHOR
ENERGY FACILITIES

SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE / ELECTRONIC WARFARE

SNIPING OPERATIONS

SPECIALIZED DEMOLITION OPS

TACTICAL DECEPTION OPS

TACTICAL RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL

VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF VESSELS





116 Ops 137 Missions Since 1990

Peleliu ARG / 15th MEU Capabilities

“Iron Nickel” (~2,200 Marines)

(vic Karachi)



2 x KC-130J

- **BLT 1/4**
- **HMM-165**
- **CLB-15**

4 x CH-53

+ 3 x MH-53s not depicted

3 x UH-1

4 x AH-1

12 x CH-46

USS Peleliu (LHA-5)

USS Dubuque (LPD-8)

USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52)

Ground Combat & Tactical Vehicle Strategy

* Supports the 182k end strength force

Sustainment

ITV
#411

2026

HMMWV ECV & A2
#18,172

2030

*SMI Canceled

MTVR
#8,750

2028

LVSR
#2,000

2033

LAV
#925

2035

AAV
#1,058

2035

MRAP
#2,510

2030

M1A1
#371

2050

Selected Upgrades & Recapitalization

ACV: #694
IOC: 2020
FOC: 2028

AAV SUP: #392
IOC: 2019
FOC: 2023

ITV: #411
IOC: ~2021
FOC: ~2026

JLTV: #5,500
IOC: 2018
FOC: 2021

"We will continue to prioritize the fielding of a self-deploying, high-speed amphibious combat vehicle that will meet our requirements for the future even as we implement the first phase of the current Amphibious Combat Vehicle Program." -- CPG 2015

Ground Combat & Tactical Vehicle Strategy

Selected Upgrades & Recapitalization

ACV: #694
IOC: 2020
FOC: 2028

- Streamlined acquisition: ACV 1.1 (#204) IOC 4QtrFY20
- 1.2 (#490) mission variants /seek a self-deployer
- 1.1 & 1.2 provides six of ten infantry battalion lift equivalents
- Flexible delivery methods and growth...Complement to AAV

AAV SUP: #392
IOC: 2019
FOC: 2023

- HWS was possible trade space too high, remains valid, 2025 DP
- AAV SUP improves capability in 4 of the 10 AA companies
- Underpins a 2 MEB surface assault requirement
- Mitigates a force protection gap in capability

JLTV: #5,500
IOC: 2018
FOC: 2021

- Replaces the armored portion of the current HMMWV fleet
- Support multiple mission packages from two base vehicles
  - 4-door Combat Tactical and 2-door Combat Support
- Modular armor enables transportability and future armor

ITV: #411
IOC: ~2021
FOC: ~2026

- Require a modern ITV capability
- Light strike vehicle (LSV) variant and prime mover (PM) variant
- On going effort to more efficiently sustain
- Studying modifications or a replacement platform

Strategy favors recapitalization/upgrade of selected systems and sustainment of legacy systems over modernization of legacy systems

ACV Acquisition Strategy



BAE/IVECO

GDLS

SAIC / TERREX

Lockheed Martin/Patria

Total Requirement (12 BNs)



AAV Survivability Upgrade and Sustainment 392

(armor, suspension, drive train, communications)

Procure Non-Developmental ACV (1.1) 204

([illegible]uction Models)

F[illegible] ACV (1.2) Variants 490

([illegible], Fires, Log, Etc)

Procure ACV (2.0) High Water Speed

(Vehicle/Connector)

- **Key Considerations**
  - No changes to current Amphibious Shipbuilding Plan
  - No change to currently programmed connectors
  - Vehicle square footage is a finite

Connector Strategy

Work closely with our Naval partners on the next generation of surface connectors.



ACV: How We Got Here



- 1988: Initial Requirement for High Water Speed 1013 (12 BNs of lift)
- 2011: EFV Cancelled…Cost and Operational Effectiveness
- 2012: Established a Cross Functional Project Office to Look at ACV Options
- 2014: CMC Red Team
- 2014: Site Visits to Nevada Test Sites
- 2014: CMC Decision
- 2014: MROC Approval

High Water Speed Possible But at a Cost:

- ☒ $12-14 Million Per Vehicle
    - 100% of Ground Modernization Account
- ☒ Initial Operating Capability 2025
- ☒ New Technology – Program Risk
- ☒ Not Optimized for 90% of Mission
    - Land Operations
- ☒ Force Protection Less Than 1X
- ☒ Limited Growth Potential
    - Avg Growth 20-25%
- ☒ High Fuel Consumption at Sea

Time for a Revised Acquisition Strategy

ACV 1.1 Delivery Methods


MPF Shipping
Seabase / MLP
SSC

Seabase

ACV 1.1 can provide protected mobility to an infantry unit which was vertically inserted earlier in an operation.

ACV 1.1 can be part of the follow-on echelon arriving at the Sea Base via MPF shipping.


MPF Shipping
Advanced Base/MLP
JHSV

Secured Port

In scenarios where ACV 1.1 is located within JHSV range of the objective area, it can be embarked at an advanced base or via a MLP for movement to a secured austere port.


MPF Shipping
Seabase/RRDF
LCU/INLS

In-stream

If a port is not available ACV 1.1 can be offloaded to a RRDF and utilize either the INLS or LCU for movement to a secured beach.

An in-stream offload is used when piers are not available but the situation permits anchoring ships near the shore.


ARG
L-Class
AE

Assault Echelon

If ACV 1.1 meets objective swim and L-class interoperability requirements it may be used in the assault echelon.

Ground Combat Element Vision

“Risk and Opportunity”



1) Focus on our infantry soul, expeditionary, primarily dismounted, and forward, from the sea

2) Raising the capabilities of the GCE Marine

3) Employing three reinforced rifle companies in a dispersed, distributed, and/or disaggregated manner while retaining the capability to fight concentrated

4) Sufficient lift to provide armored protection for one reinforced division-sized element operating in urban littoral environments

5) Employing scalable, deployable, employable, and sustainable expeditionary forces that can rapidly concentrate from a disaggregated, forward-deployed posture

“Our greatest risk may be not embracing opportunities to innovate and adapt”

Requirements for our GCE to meet Expeditionary Force 21’s Vision

- Embrace the fact that the building block for how we fight is the rifle squad, specifically the 648 rifle squads in our 24 infantry battalions.
- Embrace the fact that these rifle squads – *our foundation* – will operate primarily dismounted, while supported by platforms such as vehicles, aircraft, and small boats.
- Embrace the fact that our rifle squads must have priority when it comes to manning, equipping, and training.
  - This effort starts from the moment that an infantryman joins our Corps;
  - Our rifle squad leaders must be – in reality – the most carefully selected and resourced NCOs in our entire Corps.

Vision GCE Characteristics

- The infantry battalion remains a primarily foot mobile force and a bulk of its T/E is required to be moved by its personnel, on foot;
- Given the increasing enemy area-denial threats, the rest of our GCE must possess capabilities that are easily transportable in MV-22s and CH-53Ks;
- Our GCE must be combined arms capable:
  - The ability to aggressively fire and maneuver;
  - The ability to disperse or distribute and concentrate forces;
  - The ability to employ decentralized fires and distributed maneuver.
- Our GCE must be cross-domain capable: while operating as part of a MAGTF, must be manned, trained and equipped to exploit land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains to achieve the desired result;

GCE Proposition
Adapt and Innovate

1. focus on our infantry soul, expeditionary, primarily dismounted, and forward, from the sea
2. raise the capabilities of every Marine assigned to our GCE
3. ensure that all infantry battalions are capable of employing three reinforced rifle companies in a dispersed, distributed, and/or disaggregated manner while retaining the capability to fight concentrated;
4. ensure that we have sufficient lift to provide armored protection for one reinforced division-sized element operating in urban littoral environments
5. ensure that we are capable of employing scalable, deployable, employable, and sustainable expeditionary forces that can rapidly concentrate from a disaggregated, forward-deployed posture.

SPMAGTF CR in South Sudan

- Trained to provide security for U.S. property and evacuate Americans when needed.
- Capable of responding to a crisis within six hours of notification.

- **South Sudan Response**
  - 21 Dec 13: A mission to evacuate Americans from South Sudan was aborted when three CV-22 (SOF) aircraft were fired upon as they prepared to land in Bor, South Sudan.
  - 23 Dec 13: 150 Marines on MV-22s and KC-130Js were relocated to the Horn of Africa from Spain
  - 3 January 2014:
    - A squad-size element of U.S. Marines aboard (2) KC-130Js from SPMAGTF-CR flew from Entebbe, Uganda into Juba, South Sudan
    - Successfully evacuated more than 20 personnel from the U.S. Embassy


France
Bay of Biscay
Croatia
Romania
Serbia
Italy
Bulgaria
Black Sea
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Turkey
Mediterranean Sea
Syria
Lebanon
Iraq
Jordan
Morocco
Algeria
Libya
Egypt
Saudi Arabia
Western Sahara
Red Sea
Mauritania
Mali
Niger
Sudan
Chad
Eritrea
Yemen
Senegal
Burkina Faso
Gulf of Aden
Guinea
Benin
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Côte d'Ivoire
Togo
Ghana
Liberia
Central African Republic
Ethiopia
Cameroon
Gulf of Guinea
Somalia
Equatorial Guinea
Kenya
Gabon
Congo
Rwanda
DR Congo

	DJI	Entebbe, Uganda	Juba, South Sudan
Moron ⬟	3050 NM		
DJI ✦		930 NM	
Entebbe, Uganda ●			325 NM

AFSB SPMAGTF
Concept of Employment

Missions:

- ✓ Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
- ✓ Embassy Reinforcement
- ✓ ISR
- ✓ Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
- ✓ MIO/VBSS
- ✓ Limited NEO
- ✓ Limited FHA/DR
- ✓ Limited Amphibious Raid

Assumptions:

- 300 pax berthing module installed (149 + 300 = 449)
- Ordnance magazines and ready service lockers available
- MV-22 flight deck, SOF, C2 and C4I upgrades complete
- MOGAS modifications complete


Command Element
Ground Combat Element
Logistics Combat Element
Aviation Combat Element
NECC
CE
(1) OIC
(1) Sen Enl Adv
(2) OpsO/OpsChf
(1) CoGysgt
(1) 0621 Radio Operator
(4) FST 0621s
(1) FAC
(1) 0802 FO
(1) 0651 Data Tech
(1) Radio Repair
(2) 0211 HUMINT
(6) 0317 Snipers
(6) SOFLE
Per Platoon
(3) Corpsman
(1) Fire Support Man
W
DET
EOD
LS
MP
VMM
DET
DET
ML
DET
Total w/ ACE Option 1: 403
Total w/ ACE Option 2: 443

Capabilities

- 4 x MV-22 operating spots
- Hangar 2 x MV-22 folded, 1 x MV-22 spread for aviation maintenance
- Medical spaces/Lvl I treatment; supports embarked ERSS
- C2 planning spaces for CE
- 2 x 11M Riverine Patrol Boat; 2 x 11M RHIB
- 12 x CRRC

Sustainment

- 449 available berthing for embarked forces (with berthing module)
- 10 DOS on board; UNREP every 10 days
- Vertical resupply to units ashore
- MOGAS 4K/JP5 380K Gal

Ground Mobility

- 8 x Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV)
- 12 x Expanded Capability Vehicles (ECV) w/various trailers

CE: HUMINT, Scout Snipers, SOFLE, FAC, FO, Radio Operators, Radio Repair, Data Techs,

GCE: Rifle Co : 3x Rifle Plt; 1x Weapons Plt, 1x Mortar Sec, 1x HMG Sec

LCE: Independent Duty Corpsman, Combat Engineers, EOD, Landing Support, Motor-T Maint, Supply, Law Enforcement Det

ACE: Options:
1) 6 x MV-22, 3 x RQ-21
2) 4 x MV-22, 2 x UH-1, 3 x RQ-21

NECC: Costal Riverine Det

TALON REACH 2015

- Persistent Close Air Support (PCAS) successfully demonstrated the ability to integrate automated, digital, real-time coordination capability into a military aircraft system, including rail-launched munitions, digital data links and advanced software ISO ground forces.

- Utilizing COTS and GOTS technology from concept to trial in less than 120 days.

- **Company (-) operating nearly 200 miles from HHQ or any reinforcements employed armed MV-22 with Griffin Missile and Switchblade UAS ISO GCE.**

- Ground users with KILSWITCH tablets conducted collaborative planning, real-time SA on friendly positions, and utilized real-time FMV feeds from KC130J.

- PCAS enabled both JTAC and Weapons Systems Officer to share real-time information, enabling them to quickly confirm the shot and execute the order.

BA14: Operationalizing Expeditionary Force 21

ESG-2/2d MEB Crisis Response operations to assist Host Nation forces in reducing a security and stability crisis to a level within Host Nation capability.

- Rapid response across littorals:17 missions in 12 days at distances in excess of 500nm
- Used naval maneuver and sea-basing IOT conduct:
  - Embassy reinforcement
  - NEO
  - Counter Terrorism
  - Foreign Internal Defense
- Minimum footprint ashore with flexible response to crisis
- Maintained freedom of navigation in the sea lines


SPMAGTF
MEB CE (FWD)
Immediate Response
Light MEB capacity within
3 to 7 days
MEB (CE)
Fly-in Echelon
MEU
24 MEU
SPMAGTF-CR
Aggregation &
Immediate Response

Composite forward & rapidly deployable forces under a Scalable Fly-in Command Element (FICE)

Experiments /Initiatives Examples

- Fly-in Integrated Command Element (FICE) as the lead element of an integrated ESG/MEB Command Element (CE).
- Cyberspace Electromagnetic Warfare Coordination Cell (CEWCC) integrated planning and execution and assessed cyberspace and EMS actions across the MAGTF’s operational environment.
- Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) as an alternate command and control, operational, and logistics platform.
- Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship (T-AKE) as an alternate command and control, operational, and logistics platform.

Coalition

- (9) Countries Providing Forces
- (18) Countries with Staff Augments and Observers

PACIFIC HORIZON 2015 (PH15)
14 Oct – 7 Nov 2014


B
4
373
ACE AAOE
C
4
GCE AAOE
Dets
1
1/4
LCE AAOE
A
4
X
Dets
Det
373
Jump
ESG-3
ACB-1
LSA
NBG-1
AAOG TOC
LFSP
Dets
ACU-5
BMU-1
AAOE
BHG
X
Suitcase
CRS-3
ACU-1
3

Purpose/Mission: Crisis response MPF-enabled HA/DR Operations

Exercise Accomplishments:

- ESG-3 CMPF certification
- Exercised 1st MEB FICE (“Suitcase” and “Jump”)
- Simultaneous in-stream off-load of two MPF ships via INLS and MLP/LCAC
- 98 PEI through-put from T-AK w/INLS
- 126 PEI though-put from LMSR w/MLP and LCAC
- Transferred select PEIs down to ERPs via GCSS-MC
- Associated MEF-level crisis action planning exercise (CATEX)
- (PMS-385) MLP conducted interface with Watson-class LMSR

I MEF Units:

- 1st MEB CE
- I MEF AAOG
- 1st Bn, 4th Mar
- MWSS-373
- 7th ESB
- GSMT Co
- 1st BHG

Ships:

- USNS Dahl (LMSR)
- USNS Williams (T-AK)
- USNS Montford Point (MLP)

ESG-3 Units:

- ESG-3 CE
- NBG-1
- BMU-1
- ACB-1
- ACU-1
- ACU-5

Others:

- Coastal Riverine Squadron 3 (CRS-3)
- Strategic and Theater Sealift Program Office (PMS-385)

~2000 Navy, Marine and MSC participants

Admin:

- MEF CATEX: 8-9 Oct 14
- Scenario EndEx: 25 Oct 14
- Back-load complete: 2 Nov 14
- Exercise Hotwash: 5 Nov 14

Fiscal: Est. Total: $3.1M (pending final transactions)

- $2.223M ship operating cost (PACFLT)
- $650K Arrival and Assembly (I MEF 1B1B)
- $250K FTX (I MEF 1A1A)

Task Force 58, 25 November 2001

Vice Admiral Willie Moore to Brigadier General Jim Mattis: “Go to Kandahar and raise hell!”


KYRGYZSTAN
RBAIJAN
N
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
Pittsburgh
Columbus
Kabul
PAKISTAN
INDIA
Gardez
Route 1
Nashville
AFGHANISTAN
Kandahar
“Rhino”
IRAN
AIT
Atlanta
PAKISTAN
Shamsi
Jacobabad
NEPAL
Moblie
BAHRAIN
QATAR
OMAN
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
RABIA